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ABSTRACT	REWARD	ALLOCATION	FOR	MAXIMIING	ENERGY	SAVINGS		IN	A	TRANSPORTATION	SYSTEM		MAY	2018		ADEWALE	O	ODUWOLE,		B.S.,	GEORGE	WASHINGTON	UNIVERSITY,	DC			M.P.S.,	GEORGE	WASHINGTON	UNIVERSITY,	DC		M.S.,	UNIVERSITY	OF	MASSACHUSETTS,	AMHERST		Directed	by:	Professor.	Song	Gao	Ph.D			Transportation	 has	 a	 major	 impact	 on	 our	 society	 and	 environment,	contributing	 70%	 of	 U.S	 petroleum	 use,	 28%	 of	 U.S.	 greenhouse	 gas	 (GHG)	emissions,	 over	 34,000	 fatalities	 and	 2.2	 million	 injuries	 in	 2013.	 Punitive	approaches	to	used	to	tackle	environmental	issues	in	the	transportation	sector,	such	as	congestion	pricing	have	been	well	documented,	although	the	use	of	incentives	or	rewards	 lags	 behind	 in	 comparison.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 use	 of	 more	 fuel-efficient,	alternate	 energy	 vehicles	 and	 various	 other	 energy	 reduction	 strategies;	 energy	consumption	 can	 be	 lowered	 through	 incentivizing	 alternative	 modes	 of	transportation.	 This	 paper	 focused	 on	modifying	 travelers’	 behavior	 by	 providing	rewards	 to	enable	 shifts	 to	more	energy-efficient	modes,	 (e.g.,	 from	auto	 to	either	bus	 or	 bicycles).	 Optimization	 conditions	 are	 formulated	 for	 the	 problem	 to	understand	 solution	 properties,	 and	 numerical	 tests	 are	 carried	 out	 to	 study	 the	effects	 of	 system	 parameters	 (e.g.,	 token	 budget	 and	 coefficient	 of	 tokens)	 on	 the	optimal	 solutions	 (i.e.,	 energy	 savings).	 The	 multinomial	 logit	 model	 is	 used	 to	
vi	
formulate	 the	 full	problem,	 comprised	of	an	objective	 function	and	constraint	of	a	token	 budget	 ranging	 from	 $5,000-$10,000.	 Comparably,	 the	 full	 problem	 is	computationally	reduced	by	various	parameterization	strategies,	in	that	the	number	of	 tokens	 assigned	 to	 all	 travelers’	 is	 parameterized	 and	 proportional	 to	 the	expected	energy	savings.	An	optimization	solution	algorithm	is	applied	with	a	global	and	 local	 solver	 to	solve	a	 lagrangian	sub-problem	and	a	duo	of	heuristic	 solution	algorithms	of	 the	original	problem.	These	were	determined	necessary	 to	attain	an	optimal	and	feasible	solution.	Input	data	necessary	for	this	analysis	is	obtained	for	the	Town	of	Amherst,	MA	from	the	Pioneer	Valley	Planning	Commission	(PVPC).	The	results	 demonstrated	 strong	 evidence	 to	 conclude	 a	 positive	 correlation	 between	the	system’s	energy	savings	and	the	aforementioned	system	parameters.	The	 local	and	global	solvers	solution	algorithm	reduced	the	average	energy	consumption	by	11.48%	 -	 19.91%	 and12.79%	 –	 21.09%	 consecutively	 for	 the	 identified	 token	budget	 range	 from	 a	 base	 case	 scenario	 with	 no	 tokens	 assigned.	 The	 duo	 of	lagrangian	 heuristic	 algorithms	 improved	 the	 full	 problems	 solution	 i.e.,	 higher	energy	 savings,	 when	 optimized	 over	 a	 local	 solver,	 while	 the	 parameterized	problem	formulations	resulted	in	higher	energy	savings	when	compared	to	the	full	problems’	 formulation	 solution	 over	 local	 solver,	 but	 higher	 energy	 savings	compared	 over	 the	 global	 solver.	 The	 Computational	 run-time	 for	 the	 global	 and	local	solvers	solution	algorithm	for	the	full	problem	formulation	required	43	hours	and	 24	minutes	 consecutively,	while	 the	 local	 solver	 for	 the	 lagrangian	 heuristics	and	 parameterized	 problem	 solution	 algorithm	 took	 13	 minutes	 and	 7	 minutes	consecutively.	
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Future	 research	 on	 this	 paper	will	 be	 comprised	 of	 a	 bi-level	 optimization	problem	 formulation	where	 a	 high	 level	 optimization	 aims	 at	maximizing	 system-wide	energy	savings,	while	a	 low-level	consumer	surplus	maximization	problem	is	solved	for	each	system	user.		
Key	 Words:	 Energy	 Savings,	 Fuel	 Consumption,	 Energy	 Optimization,	Incentive-Based	Pricing,	and	System	Optimization.	
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CHAPTER	I	
 INTRODUCTION	
1.1 Background		The	motivation	behind	providing	 incentives	 for	maximizing	energy	savings	in	 a	 transportation	 system	 stems	 from	 the	 far-reaching	 impact	 of	 energy	consumption	on	our	society	and	environment.	Transportation	activities	accounted	for	33	percent	of	CO2	emissions	 from	 fossil	 fuel	 combustion	 in	2011,	while	 it	was	estimated	that	approximately	25%	of	household	vehicle	mile	traveled	(VMT)	were	commute	trips	and	79%	of	commuters	drove	alone	to	work	(1).		Virtually	all	of	the	energy	consumed	in	this	end-use	sector	came	from	petroleum	products	and	nearly	65%	of	the	emissions	resulted	from	gasoline	consumption	for	personal	vehicle	use.	In	 the	 long	 term,	 energy	 consumption	patterns	 respond	 to	 changes	 that	 affect	 the	scale	 of	 consumption	 (e.g.,	 population,	 number	 of	 cars),	 the	 efficiency	with	which	energy	 is	 used	 in	 equipment	 (e.g.,	 cars,	 power	 plants,	 steel	mills)	 and	 behavioral	choices	(e.g.,	walking,	bicycling,	or	telecommuting	to	work	instead	of	driving).	While	technology	 has	 generally	 been	 used	 to	 increase	 fuel	 economy	 by	 improving	efficiency	(which	has	reduced	CO2	emissions)	along	the	years(2).	Historically,	there	has	been	a	negative	perception	and	public	resistance	conveyed	by	road	users	on	the	implementation	of	punitive	approaches	such	as	congestion	pricing	to	reduce	energy	consumption.	Inequality	on	the	end-users	side	is	one	of	many	other	major	concerns	highlighted	in	recent	literature.	Hence,	reward-based	approach	is	considered	a	more	user-friendly	policy	in	reducing	road	congestion	and	emissions.	
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It	 is	 widely	 recognized	 that	 governments	 could	 reduce	 congestion	 and	 its	associated	 environmental	 effects	 by	 charging	 road	 users	 their	 marginal	 cost	 of	excess	 demand	 during	 peak	 hours	 in	 transportation	 systems.	 This	 policy	 is	commonly	 known	 as	 congestion	 pricing.	 Congestion	 pricing	 has	 been	 well	researched,	documented	and	implemented	in	a	few	major	cities	in	the	past	decade,	although	 it	 has	 faced	major	 criticism	 and	 public	 resentment	 from	 an	 equitability	point	of	view	from	connected	neighborhoods	where	it	is	implemented.	In	the	most	recent	field	of	sustainability,	which	is	seen	to	be	gaining	more	popularity	in	both	the	academic	 and	 professional	 career	 disciplines,	 equity	 is	 considered	 one	 of	 three	major	characteristics	that	define	the	quintessence	of	achieving	a	sustainable-based	transportation	 policy.	 In	 sustainable	 transportation	 engineering	 and	 planning	discipline,	 governments	 are	 starting	 to	 consider	 the	 efficient	 use	 of	 incentive	policies	as	a	primary	 substitute	 to	 congestion	pricing,	with	 the	outlook	 that	 it	has	the	potential	to	alleviate	the	most	significant	critic	of	congestion	pricing,	equity.	Recent	 literatures	 have	 highlighted	 governments	 intervention	 through	incentive	policies	such	as	offering	financial	incentive	in	form	of	subsidies,	gift	cards,	transit	 passes	 or	 monetary	 payment	 reimbursements	 to	 road	 users,	 to	 aide	intelligent	decisions	on	travel	 time	and	mode	choice	of	 transportation	as	potential	substitute	to	congestion	pricing	policies	externalities.	As	of	March	2016,	the	United	States	government	through	the	Department	of	 the	Navy	(DON)	and	Department	of	Transportation	 (DOT)	 established	 a	 mass	 transit	 benefit	 program,	 the	 transit	incentive	 program	 (TIP)	 for	DON,	 part-time	 federal	 and	 intern	 employees	 to	 help	reduce	 their	 daily	 contribution	 to	 traffic	 congestion	 and	 air	 pollution	 to	 and	 from	
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work,	in	conjunction	with	expanding	their	commuting	alternatives(3).	Applicable	to	civilian	 and	 military	 employees	 in	 the	 District	 of	 Columbia,	 Maryland,	 Virginia	(DMV),	 all	 geographic	 counties	 within	 their	 associated	 boundaries	 and	 all	 DON	facilities	within	the	US	territories,	the	TIP	provides	transit	benefits	of	$255/month	(individual	 benefit)	 excluding	 parking	 fees	 for	 transit	 modes	 by	 commuter	 bus,	commuter	 trains,	 subway/light	 rail,	 vanpool	 and	 ferries.	 Similarly,	 the	Environmental	 Protection	 Agency	 (EPA)	 and	 the	 Department	 of	 Interior	 (DOI)	adopted	 a	 similar	 program,	 the	 Transportation	 Subsidy	 Program	 (TSP)	 that	provides	 financial	 incentives	 to	encourage	DOI	employees	nationwide	 to	commute	by	means	other	than	single-occupancy	motor	vehicles	to	and	from	work	(4).		Several	studies	have	reported	the	effects	of	 incentive	policies	on	commuter	mode	 choices,	 significant	 to	 this	 research,	Qing	 Su	 et	 al.	 2012	developed	 a	 nested	logit	model	to	examine	the	impact	of	parking	management	and	financial	subsidies	to	alternative	modes	to	drive	alone,	as	well	as	travel	demand	management	strategies	on	 people's	 commute	 mode	 choices	 in	 Seattle	 based	 on	 the	 Washington	 state	commute	 trip	 reduction	 dataset	 in	 2005.	 A	 two-level	 nested	 logit	 model	 was	selected	to	estimate	the	mode	choices	of	(motor,	non-motor	and	public)	at	the	first	level	 and	 (drive	 alone,	 share	 ride,	 transit	 and	 bike/walk)	 at	 the	 second	 level.	 A	multinomial	 logit	 model	 was	 rejected	 after	 a	 hausman	 specification	 test	 of	 the	independence	of	irrelevant	alternatives	(IIA)	property	violation	at	a	level	of	0.01(5).	Focusing	on	financial	subsidies	as	a	public	policy	tool,	findings	from	Qing	Su	and	et	al,	2012	suggests	that	commuters	respond	positively	to	direct	financial	subsidies	to	
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alternative	modes	and	represent	an	 important	contribution	 toward	understanding	how	commuter's	mode	choice	decisions	respond	to	a	variety	of	incentive	policies.		In	 general,	 there	 is	 sufficient	 data,	 research	 and	 literature	 that	 suggests	transit	 use	may	 be	 affected	 by	 incentive	 polices	 that	modify	 the	 relative	 costs	 of	travel	behavior.	According	to	the	US.	Department	of	transportation,	such	incentives	have	been	seen	to	increase	public	transportation	use	and	use	of	active	travel	options	such	as	walking	and	bicycling	particularly	among	college	students(6).	Nevertheless,	there	 is	 a	 gap	 in	 literatures	 on	 modeling	 framework	 for	 incentive	 policy	optimizations	to	reduce	energy	consumption	in	a	transportation	system.	This	forms	the	 basis	 of	 this	 study	 on	 the	 need	 for	 an	 efficacious	 modeling	 framework	 that	effectively	allocates	these	resources/incentives	to	end-users.	
1.2 Literature	Review	It	 is	 of	 importance	 to	 understand	 factors	 that	 affect	 consumer’s	transportation	 mode	 choice,	 which	 calls	 for	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 behavioral	 choice	model	while	designing	 incentive	optimization	problems.	A	 large	body	of	 literature	exists	on	such	models	using	discrete	choice	model	approaches.		For	a	review,	(Jiang	et	al.	2009)	conducted	a	study	analyzing	non-motorized	transportation	mode	choice	considering	the	influence	of	trip	purpose,	distance	and	car	availability	with	a	stated	and	revealed	preference	data	survey	in	china(7).	In	 a	 researcher	paper	by	Michael	A.	 Silas	 et	 al.	 a	mathematical	 formulation	was	 established	 to	 gain	 insights	 into	 the	 most	 efficient	 way	 to	 allocate	 financial	incentives	to	customers	in	an	urban	environment	in	other	to	maximize	participation	
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and	optimally	distribute	the	incentives(8).	The	methodology	involved	the	utilization	of	 the	 Karush-Kuhn	 Tucker	 (KKT)	 condition	 to	 find	 the	 optimal	 amount	 of	 truck	tours/trips	 shifted	 to	 non-peak	 hours.	 Two	 main	 important	 decisions	 were	identified	 in	 this	 study	 for	 the	optimal	 allocation	of	 an	 incentive	budget;	 the	 total	budget	 to	be	distributed,	 and	 the	allocation	of	 the	budget	among	different	market	segmentations.	Focusing	on	the	 latter,	mathematical	 formulations	were	developed,	which	involved	the	derivation	of	the	optimal	incentives	distinguished	by	two	types	of	 constraints,	 namely,	 an	 exogenous	 and	 endogenous	 budget.	 The	 latter	 being	 a	self-sustaining	budget	is	formulated	as	a	function	of	the	total	revenue	generated	by	the	 system	 and	 the	 former	 an	 external	 budget	 distributed	 to	 recipients	 of	 the	incentive,	 formulated	 to	 require	 the	 total	 amount	 of	 incentives	 distributed	 to	 the	recipients	 be	 less	 that	 or	 equal	 to	 the	 budget	 constraint.	 While	 considering	 the	exogenous	 budgets,	 numerical	 results	 showed	 that	 there	 was	 an	 increasing	 non-linear	relationship	between	the	number	of	tours	transferred	to	the	off-hours	and	the	given	 incentive	budget.	This	 relationship	was	 characterized	by	a	 rapid	 increase	at	the	beginning	 followed	by	smaller	 increases	 in	 the	number	of	 tours	 transferred	 to	off-hours.	Numerical	results	of	 the	endogenous	budget	showed	that	the	number	of	off-hour	tours	increased	as	the	regular-hour	tour	revenues	increased.	With	a	similar	characteristic	 as	 the	 former,	 the	 off-hours	 tour	 increased	 rapidly	 at	 the	beginning	followed	by	an	incremental	reduction	in	the	increments	(8).		In	 a	 study	 of	 Intermodal	 Transportation	 Network	 Design	 with	 Emission	Incentive	and	Mode	Transfer	cost	by	Peiyu	Luo	et	al.,	the	researchers	considered	the	problem	 of	 designing	 an	 intermodal	 transportation	 network	 consisting	 of	 three	
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modes;	 highway,	 rail	 and	 inland	 waterway	 with	 a	 partial	 objective	 to	 incentivize	shippers	 using	 a	more	 energy	 efficient	modes	 such	 as	waterways	 and	 railways	 to	promote	 intermodal	 transportation	 while	 satisfying	 a	 fixed	 annual	 demand	 from	multiple	 origin-destination	 pairs(9).	 The	 problem	 was	 framed	 as	 a	 linear	programming	formulation	to	minimize	the	total	transportation	cost	and	time	value,	while	including	incentive	rebates	motivated	by	the	objective	of	promoting	the	use	of	inland	waterways	and	railways	by	the	USDOT	on	a	hypothesized	super	network.	No	incentives	were	awarded	to	roadways.	Conclusions	from	numerical	results	outlined	revealed	incentives	rebates	for	railways	and	waterways	encouraged	shippers	to	use	railways	 and	waterways	which	 contribute	 to	 significant	 reductions	 emissions	 and	total	transportation	cost	while	transportation	time	increased.	A	study	on	the	optimization	of	incentive	policies	for	plug-in	electric	vehicles	Nie	Yu	et	al.,	proposed	an	optimization	modeling	framework	that	could	potentially	assist	policy	makers	in	deciding	when	and	how	much	money	should	be	invested	on	what	incentive	programs	in	order	to	achieve	a	desired	goal,	e.g	reduce	greenhouse	gas	or	dependence	on	petroleum	products,	while	accelerating	the	adoption	of	plug-in	vehicles	(10).	The	problem	was	formulated	with	two	incentives	over	an	analysis	period,	 purchased	 rebates	 and	 publicly	 funded	 charging	 stations	with	 the	 goal	 of	promoting	 plug-in	 electric	 vehicles.	 Due	 to	 the	 highly	 non-linear,	 non-convex	attribute	 of	 the	 problem,	 a	 non-linear	 optimization	 model	 was	 used	 to	 allocate	resources	to	each	of	the	incentives	over	the	analysis	period.	Consumer	choices	were	modeled	using	a	simple	logit-based	vehicle	choice	model.	To	support	policy	making,	a	satisfactory	improvement	over	existing	decision	was	deemed	a	sufficient	solution,	
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hence	the	use	of	the	steepest	descent	direction	algorithm	was	proposed	for	finding	a	local	 optimum	 while	 proving	 that	 the	 KKT	 conditions	 are	 necessary	 for	 a	 local	optimum	 solution.	 Alternative	 polices	 were	 subsequently	 modeled	 against	 an	optimal	 policy	 to	 conduct	 a	 sensitivity	 analysis	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 each	 proposed	policies	to	the	base	case	scenario.	While	the	algorithm	used	in	this	study	provided	a	satisfactory	 convergence	 and	 was	 reasonably	 efficient,	 in	 theory, a local optimum 
does not necessarily yield the best solution to the true solution.  A	 study	 by	 Wilfredo	 F.	 Yushimito	 et	 al.	 2013	 proposed	 a	 two-staged	optimization	model	for	staggered	work	hours	of	a	firm	with	an	aim	to	flatten	peak	hours	 of	 workers	 by	 assigning	 them	 to	 shoulders	 of	 peak	 hours	 under	 incentive	policies,	consequentially	lowering	peak	trip	demands.	A	quadratic	objective	function	formulated	as	a	nonlinear	mathematical	model	as	established	by	Ban	et	al.	2008	is	used	to	solver	the	network	optimization,	constrained	by	arrival	and	departure	times	and	 benefits	 from	 government	 incentives.	 Hence,	 the	 first	 stage	 on	 the	 firm’s	workers	 assignment	 decision	 and	 second	 stage	with	workers	 decisions	 on	 arrival	and	 departure	 times.	 The	 underlying	 model	 quantifies	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 firm’s	workers	 response	 to	 external	 incentives	 and	 evaluates	 departure	 schedules	required	 to	 achieve	 a	 social	 optimum.	 The	 algorithm	 utilized	 in	 this	 study	 was	heuristic	 and	 at	 best	 able	 to	 find	 a	 feasible	 local	 solution	 that	 achieved	 a	 social	optimum	 in	 the	 system.	 The	 principle	 behind	 achieving	 a	 social	 optimum	was	 to	bound	 the	 government	 incentive	budget	by	 congestion	 savings	 so	 that	 the	 society	will	be	better	off.	This	guarantees	that	no	extra	fund	will	be	required	so	as	to	ensure	the	amount	of	incentive	will	not	offset	the	savings	in	travel	time.	The	social	objective	
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was	ensured	 in	 the	algorithms	 iterative	process	by	 setting	 the	difference	between	the	savings	in	the	total	systems	travel	time	and	budget	to	be	greater	than	0	(11).	Bie	 Jing	et	al.	2009	conducted	a	 similar	 study	using	economic	 incentives	 to	influence	drivers’	 route	 choice	 for	 safety	 enhancement.	 	 The	modeling	 framework	was	based	of	a	route-based	incentive	structure	introduced	by	a	logistic	company	in	co-operation	with	an	insurance	company	where	drivers	get	rewarded	for	taking	the	safest	routes	(12).	In	theory	of	this	study,	the	incentive	program	adopts	a	win-win	situation	that	bring	benefits	to	all	stakeholders,	leading	the	formulation	of	a	bi-level	optimization	 designed	 to	 minimize/maximize	 cost	 and	 benefits	 whereby	 drivers	choose	 a	 safer	 route	 and	 the	 logistics	 and	 insurance	 company	are	never	 at	 a	 loss.	Hence	 safety	 in	 terms	of	 equity	 on	 the	 incentive	program	 is	 certainly	 guaranteed.	The	efficiency	of	the	solution	algorithms	on	the	aforementioned	study	was	exclusive.	All	theses	studies	are	fundamental	to	understanding	various	incentive-based	optimization	models	but	are	limited	in	efficiency	and	equity	of	their	solutions.	This	paper	will	be	predominantly	focused	on	the	use	of	a	global	algorithm	solution	and	its	solution	effect	on	a	local	algorithm	solution	along	side	an	array	of	mathematical	problem	formulations.		In	 furtherance,	 we	 simplify	 our	 model	 assumptions	 using	 a	 multinomial	discrete	choice	model	with	aggregated	coefficients	in	predicting	consumer’s	choice	on	the	menu	of	mode	choices	provided.	We	take	into	account	the	baseline	standard	variables	 relevant	 to	 decision	mode	 choice	 in	 to	 this	 case	 study;	 in	 vehicle	 travel	time,	 out	 of	 vehicle	 travel	 time	 and	 cost	 in	 form	 of	 a	 token	 incentive	 parameter	specific	to	this	case	study.	
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1.3 Statement	of	Contribution		 In	the	studies	discussed	above,	little	attention	has	been	given	to	near	global	and	efficient	solutions	in	terms	of	equity	on	incentive-	based	optimization,	which	is	a	 reasonable	 objective.	 Contribution	 belongs	 to	 a	 limited	 body	 of	 literature	 on	dealing	 with	 non-linear,	 non-convex	 incentive	 optimization	 problems	 on	transportation	 systems,	 which	 is	 considered	 a	 dynamic	 and	 evolving	 field	 of	investigation	in	transportation	demand	modeling.	We	have	a	non-convex	non	-linear	problem,	which	guarantees	there	could	be	multiple	 local	minima	(maxima)	solutions	to	the	problem	with	high	computational	time	of	obtaining	a	 solution.	Generally,	 finding	a	global	optima	solution	 is	difficult	and	 really	 only	 practical	 for	 relatively	 small	 problems.	 Hence,	 we	 explore	 both	global	and	local	solvers	with	a	solution	algorithm	to	obtain	an	optimal	and	feasible	solution	and	establish	the	quality/efficiency	of	both	solutions	on	the	problem.	In	 the	 first	problem	variant	we	consider	an	 incentive	optimization	problem	that	includes	a	lagrangian	sub-problem	where	travelers	are	rewarded	according	to	a	multinomial	 logit	model	constrained	by	a	reward	budget	to	induce	energy	savings.	For	the	first	variant,	we	utilize	a	global	and	local	solver	algorithm	to	solve	the	non-linear,	 non-convex	 problem	 to	 attain	 optimal	 and	 feasible	 solutions	 in	 terms	 of	energy	savings.	A	unique	feature	of	this	paper	is	the	second	variant,	which	consists	of	 a	 series	of	parameterized	 formulations	of	 the	 first	problem,	 solved	with	 a	 local	solver	 algorithm	 only.	 For	 this	 variant	 we	 establish	 a	 modeling	 framework	 and	numerical	 results	 that	 necessitates	 equity	 in	 incentive-based	 optimizations	 such	that	the	rewards	assigned	to	travelers	are	proportional	to	energy	savings	while	the	
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expected	energy	savings	solution	deviates	from	the	optimal	solutions	of	the	original	problem.	 Theoretically,	 if	 the	 numbers	 of	 tokens	 (rewards)	 assigned	 are	 directly	proportional	 to	 the	expected	energy	savings,	 the	 incentive	policy	 is	constrained	to	be	 more	 equitable.	 We	 demonstrate	 that	 a	 high-quality	 solution	 can	 be	 obtained	quite	 fast	with	minor	 deviations	 on	 the	 solutions	 and	 a	 desired	 guarantee	 on	 the	performance	of	this	modeling	framework	on	problems	of	similar	characteristics.	
1.4 Research	Objective	The	 objective	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	 maximize	 energy	 savings	 by	 allocating	incentives	 to	 traveler’s	 to	 enable	 shifts	 to	 more	 energy-efficient	 modes.	Mathematical	optimization	 conditions	are	 formulated	 for	 the	problem,	 first,	 a	 full-scale	maximization	problem	followed	by	a	series	of	parameterization	formulations.	An	 optimization	 solution	 algorithm	 is	 proposed	 utilizing	 global	 and	 local	 solution	solvers	to	obtain	optimal	and	feasible	solutions.	Transportation	data	is	gathered	for	the	 Town	 of	 Amherst,	 MA	 and	 used	 as	 a	 hypothetical	 case	 study.	 Results	 are	investigated	through	numerical	tests,	using	sensitivity	analyses	to	study	the	effects	of	the	incentive	budget	and	coefficient	of	incentives	on	the	optimal	solutions	across	the	 proposed	 problem	 formulations	 and	 solution	 algorithms.	 (Note:	 Incentive,	reward	and	token	are	used	interchangeably	through	out	this	paper).	
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CHAPTER	II	
 METHODOLOGY	
2.1 Maximization	Problem	Formulation		In	 this	 section,	 the	 incentive	 policy	 design	 model	 is	 presented.	 The	formulation	for	this	problem	is	based	from	an	inference	of	the	MNL	model,	where	!	users	exist	in	the	transportation	system,	and	each	of	them	has	a	travel	choice	set	of	!!.	 A	 multinomial	 logit-model	 is	 used	 to	 calculate	 !!" ,	 the	 probability	 of	 user	 !	choosing	alternative ! ∈ !!	(Auto,	Bus,	and	Bicycle)	when	making	and	OD	trip	j	with	the	equation,	!!" =  !"# (!!")!"# (!!")!∈!! ,	 (1)		Where	!!" 	 is	 the	 systematic	utility	 for	user	!	 and	alternative	 !.	 A	 linear-in-parameter	specification	is	assumed	for	the	systematic	utility	with	two	explanatory	variables	 for	 this	 study,	 travel	 time	 !!" 	 (in-vehicle	 and	 out-vehicle	 travel	 of	 bus	included)	and	the	number	of	tokens	!!" ,	that	is,	!!" = !!!" + !!!" .	The	assumption	of	two	explanatory	variables	is	not	restrictive	and	can	be	relaxed	easily	to	account	for	more	than	two	explanatory	variables.	Travel	time	!!"  is	a	constant	for	any	given	user	and	 alternative	 across	 all	 origin-destination	 pair,	 and	 not	 a	 function	 of	 users’	choices,	as	no	congestion	effect	is	considered	given	the	homogeneous	user	behavior	by	an	aggregate	MNL	model.	Let	!!" 	be	the	energy	saving	of	alternative	!	for	individual	!	when	compared	to	a	baseline	energy	consumption	!,	assumed	a	constant,	i.e.	not	a	function	of	users’	choices	 and	 no	 tokens	 awarded.	 E!" 	 is	 the	 energy	 consumption	 attributed	 to	
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alternative	 !	 for	 individual	!.	 The	 baseline	 energy	 consumption	 E	 is	 calculated	 as	E!"× !!" 	 of	 the	 auto	 alternative.	Auto	 energy	 consumption	E!" 	 is	 calculated	 as	 the	amount	 in	 gallons	 it	 takes	 to	 traverse	 each	 OD	 pair	 in	 day,	 !!"#$ !"#$ !"#$#%& (!!)  × !"#$%&'( !".!"#.	 Bus	 and	 bicycle	 energy	 consumption	 E!" 	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 0	gallon/day	based	on	a	pre-assumption	of	a	single	occupancy	auto	vehicle.	Hence,	an	additional	 occupancy	 on	 a	 bus	 transit	 vehicle	 greater	 than	 one	 will	 result	 in	 no	additional	 energy	 consumption	 contribution	 to	 the	 system,	 therefore	 we	 can	attribute	a	null	constant	value	to	bus	energy	consumption.	The	 expected	 energy	 savings	 for	 the	 system,	 !(!),	 is	 distinguished	 by	 the	objective	function,	and	calculated	as,	Z(τ) =  !!"!∈!!!!!! !"# (!!!"!!!!")!"# (!"!"!!!!")!∈!! ,	 (2)		Assumed	a	token	budget	of	T,	and	the	constraint	is,	! τ =  !!"!∈!!!!!! !"# !!!"!!!!"!"# !"!"!!!!"!∈!! ≤ !.	 (3)		The	token	allocation	problem	is	then	formulated	as	a	constrained	non-linear	optimization	problem,		 	 	                     max!    ! !                        !. !.    ! ! ≤ !                                      ! ≥ 0	 (4)	 	The	first-order	necessary	condition	of	optimality	is	the	KKT	condition,	that	is,	
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!!(!)!!!" = λ !!(!)!!!" − µ!" ,∀! ,∀!∈ !!![! ! − !] = 0               ,!!!!!"     =  0                        ,∀! ,∀!∈ !!! ≥ 0                                 ,            !!"  ≥ 0                            ,∀! ,∀!∈ !!! ! ≤ !                            ,! ≥ 0                                 ,
			 (5)		
!, can	be	interpreted	as	the	shadow	price	of	the	budget	constraint,	that	is,	the	increase	of	the	system-wide	expected	energy	saving	if	one	more	token	is	available.	!!" 	is	zero,	if	a	positive	number	of	tokens	is	assigned	to	alternative	!	of	person	!.		The	 shadow	price	 is	 zero,	 if	 the	 constraint	 is	not	binding,	 that	 is,	 there	 are	more	 than	 enough	 tokens.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 stationary	 condition	 is	 that	 any	alternative	of	any	user	with	a	positive	number	of	allocated	tokens	has	zero	marginal	energy	 saving	 per	 allocated	 token.	 The	 shadow	price	 is	 positive	when	 the	 budget	constraint	is	binding,	that	is,	available	tokens	are	used	up.	In	this	case,	we	have	!" (!)∕!!!"!"(!)/!!!" = λ,∀! ,∀!∈ !! !!" > 0.	 (6)		The	left-hand	side	of	the	equation	can	be	interpreted	as	the	marginal	energy	saving	per	used	 token,	 and	 the	 stationary	 condition	 given	 limited	 token	budget	 is	that	any	alternative	of	any	user	with	a	positive	number	of	allocated	tokens	has	the	same	marginal	energy	saving	per	used	token.	
2.1.1 Solution	Algorithm	Due	to	the	nature	of	a	choice	probability	function,	any	solution	with	the	same	token	 differences	 across	 alternatives	 for	 a	 given	 person	 will	 give	 the	 same	probabilities	 and	 thus	 same	 expected	 energy	 savings.	 The	 expected	 token	
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consumption	 is	 however	 different,	 and	 the	 constraint	 is	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 violated	with	 smaller	 number	 of	 tokens	 assigned.	 It	 is	 therefore	 advantageous	 to	 set	!!" = 0,where !!" = min!∈!! !!" ,∀!.	The	LHS	of	the	constraint	of	the	objective	function	is	non-convex	and	thus	the	feasible	 solution	 set	 is	 highly	 nonlinear	 but	 also	 very	 likely	 non-convex.	Consequently,	 it	 is	difficult	to	establish	the	uniqueness	of	a	global	optimal	solution	and	 a	 suitable	 algorithm	 is	 necessary	 to	 find	 a	 feasible	 and	 optimal	 solution.	Preliminary	tests	on	small	problem	instances	using	Matlab’s	optimization	and	global	optimization	functions	show	that	the	constraint	is	almost	always	violated	when	it	is	binding.	It	is	therefore	speculated	that	the	constraint	is	“difficult”	and	a	Lagrangian	relaxation	algorithm	is	proposed.	Note:	The	objective	function	is	non-concave	either.	The	Lagrangian	is		!(!) = max! ! ! − ! ! − ! ,∀! ≥ 0.	 (7)		!∗	 is	 the	 optimal	 solution	 to	 the	 primal	 Problem	 (4).	 Due	 to	weak	 duality,	! ≥ ! !∗ .	!(!)	 for	 any	 value	 of	 ! provides	 an	 upper	 bound	 for	 the	 optimal	 energy	saving	and	!∗ = min!!! !(!)	 is	 the	 tightest	upper	bound.	Therefore,	 there	exists	 a	duality	 gap	 as	 the	 objective	 function	 is	 non-concave,	 that	 is,	!∗ > !(!∗).	 It	 is	 still	valuable	 to	 solve	min! !(!)	 as	 it	measures	 the	 extent	of	 the	 sub-optimality	of	 any	solution	to	the	original	problem,	along	with	a	good	lower	bound/feasible	solution.	
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2.1.2 The	sub-gradient	algorithm	!(!)	 is	 convex	 but	 not	 smooth	 (with	 kinks)	 and	 thus	 not	 differentiable	everywhere.	The	sub-gradient	algorithm	is	adopted	to	solve	min!!! !(!).	
At iteration k of the algorithm, two critical pieces of information is needed: the 
sub-gradient !! and step size !!  and a new trial value !!!!is calculated as in !!!! = !! − !!!! .	 (8)		A	sub-gradient	!! 	is	! − !(!!)	where	!! 	is	the	optimal	solution	to	the	relaxed	Problem	(7)	with	! = !! .		
The Polyak step size can be used, that is, !! =   ! !! !!!"#$! !!!(!!)! ,	 (9)		where	!!"#$! − !! 	 serves	 as	 an	 estimate	 of	!∗,	 and	 !! 	 is	 in	 the	 scale	 of	 the	objective	 value	 with	 !!!!!! = ∞, !!! < ∞!!!! . A	 practical	 choice	 for	 !! 	 could	 be	! !!!!,	where	!	is	in	the	scale	of	the	objective	value	and	!	is	a	constant	(usually	1,	but	other	values	can	be	tried)	(13).	To	effectively	optimize	the	Lagrangian	problem,	an	alternative	approach	for	the	step	size	is	to	used	to	calculate	the	step	size	when	the	polyak	step	sized	failed	to	yield	optimum	results	in	the	trial	phase	of	the	analysis.	!! =   !!(! !! !!∗)(!!)! ,	 (10)		where	!∗	 is	 the	 objective	 value	 of	 the	 best	 known	 feasible	 solution	 to	 the	original	 problem,	 and	 !! 	 is	 a	 scalar	 chosen	 between	 0	 and	 2.	 Frequently,	 the	sequence	!! 	is	determined	by	starting	with	!! = 2	and	reducing	!! 	by	a	factor	of	two	whenever	! (!!)	has	 failed	 to	decrease	 in	a	specified	number	of	 iterations.	!! 	was	
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reduced	 by	 as	 factor	 of	 2	 after	 10	 consecutive	 iterations	 when	 !(!!)	 	 failed	 to	decrease.		The	sub-gradient	algorithm	is	implemented	as	follows:	
STEP	1		
%	Set	feasible	solution	to	objective	function	‘equation	(4)’		
	 Z(!*)	lower	bound/feasible	solution	
	 !*	token	original	problem	(4)	
	 	
STEP	2	
%	Optimize	Lagrangian	function	‘maximize	equation	(7)’	
(k)	Upper	bound	!k	optimal	token	lagrangian	problem	(7)		
	
STEP	3	–	preliminary	checks	
%	Check	initial	gap	
	 if	(k)	>	Z(!*)	
	 else	STEP	1	
	
STEP	4	
%	Initial	sub-gradient	&	step	size	estimate	using	at	iteration	k	=	1	
sk		sub-gradient	!! 	=	step	size	
	
STEP	5	
%	Obtain	solution	for	k+1	iteration,	Re-optimize	Lagrangian	function	with	new	
dual	variable.	
	
While	iter	<	MaxIter	
	
k+1	=	max[0,	k	–	(ak	*	sk)];	
	 %optimize	lagrangian	
(k+1)	=	max(Z(!k)	+	[k+1	*	(g(!k)-T]);	
	
	 %	update		(sub	gradient	and	step	size)	
	 	 if	g(!k+1)	<=	T	
	 	 	 %calculate	
	Z(!k+1)	
sk+1	=	T	-	g(!k+1);	
ak	=	ck((k+1)-	Z(!k+1))/(sk+1)2;	
	
	 	 else		 sk+1	=	T	-	g(!k);	
	 	 	 ak	=	ck((k+1)-	Z(!k))/(sk+1)2;	 	
	 	 end	
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%	update	feasible	solution	
	 	 if	Z(!k+1)>	Z(!k)	
	 	 	 Z(!k+1)	=Z(!k+1)	
	 	 else	Z(!k+1)	=Z(!k)	
	 	 end	
iter	=	iter	+1;	loop	STEP	4	(recalculate	step	size	&	sub	gradient)	 	
	 	 end	
End	While	
	
Final	solution	
optimal		k+1	
optimal	!k+1	
	 optimal		(k+1)	
	
STEP	6	
%Perform	checks	
Upper	bound	should	converge	to	lower	bound	(use	upper	bound	
iteration	convergence	as	checking	criteria)	
%	Check	dual	gap	
	 	 |(k+1)	-	Z(!k+1)|	<	|(k)	-	Z(!k)|	
2.1.3 Feasible	solution	Any	 feasible	 solution	 to	 Problem	 (4)	 serves	 as	 a	 lower	 bound	 to	 !∗. A	reasonably	good	(at	 least	better	 than	assigning	zero	 tokens)	 feasible	solution	 is	 to	distribute	!!	tokens	to	each	of	the	alternatives,	and	zero	tokens	to	the	least	energy-efficient	alternative,	of	each	person.	This	ensures	that	the	token	budget	constraint	is	satisfied	 (although	not	necessarily	binding),	as	 the	expected	 token	consumption	 is	
!!!!!!!!! !!"!!!! ≤ !! !!" = !!!!!! !!"!!!!! = !!!!!! = !,!!!!!!!!!  assuming	without	 loss	 of	 generality	 that	 the	 least	 energy-efficient	 alternative	 is	 the	 last	alternative	in	the	choice	set	for	any	given	person	!.	The	optimal	solution	to	the	parameterized	problem	described	in	the	section	below	 is	 a	 feasible	 solution	 to	 the	 original	 problem.	 At	 any	 iteration	 !	 of	 the	
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Lagrangian	minimization	problem,	if	! !! ≤ !,! !! 	is	used	as	a	new	lower	bound	if	it	improved	the	existing	one.	
2.2 Parameterized	Token	Allocation	Strategies	Recent	work	has	 focused	on	optimizing	 incentives	 for	end	users	but	 ignore	equity	 related	 to	 allocating	 incentive.	 Its	 important	 to	 note	 the	 difficulty	 in	determining	an	effective	solution	is	due	to	the	assumptions	that	the	constraints	are	allocated	in	divisible	portions	of	a	constrained	budget	and	involves	utility	functions	that	are	complex	mathematical	forms	involving	probability	measures.	Therefore,	 Instead	 of	 optimizing	 over	 the	 number	 of	 tokens	 for	 every	 user	and	 alternative,	 parameterization	 of	 the	 token	 allocation	 reduces	 the	 number	 of	decision	variables	and	thus	potentially	reduces	the	computational	time	to	obtain	an	optimal	solution	in	that	the	numbers	of	tokens	assigned	are	directly	proportional	to	energy	savings.	This,	however,	comes	with	the	price	of	solution	sub-optimality.	In	 the	 simplest	 case,	 a	 single	 parameter,	!,	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 token	 average	energy	saving	(TEE),	and	the	number	of	tokens	assigned	to	alternative	! of	user	!	is:	!!" = max !!"! , 0 .	 (11)		Similar	 to	 the	 single	 parameterization	 strategy,	 a	 mode	 parameterization	strategy	is	formulated,	whereby	a	duo	of	mode	parameters	(e-bus	and	e-bicycle)	are	conceptualized	as	the	TEE	for	bus	and	bicycle	consecutively.			!!" = max !!"!! , 0 .		 (12)		Furthermore,	 a	 more	 complex	 strategy	 is	 formulated	 for	 travel-time	parameters	 e,	 based	 on	w	 categories	 of	 the	 average	 travel-time	 between	 bus	 and	
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bicycle	 modes.	 The	 categories	 are	 broken	 down	 by	 a	 method	 of	 nearly	 equal	frequency	distribution	of	trips	in	the	order	e-(7-22)minutes,	e-(23-33)minutes	and	e-(34-55)minutes.		!!" = max !!"!!" , 0 .	If 	 !!"!! 	is in the w-th bracket, where	w	=	average	travel	time	category.	
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CHAPTER	IV	
 COMPUTATIONAL	TEST	DESIGN	We	systematically	 investigate	how	 the	 changes	 in	 token	budgets	and	 token	coefficients,	 i.e.	 token	 inflation	rates,	affect	 the	system	wide	energy	savings	across	the	 original	 and	 parameterized	 problem	 formulations	 with	 a	 static	 optimization	model	 i.e.	 no	 congestion	 effects.	 Both	 the	 global	 and	 local	 ‘fmincon’	 function	 in	MATLAB’s	toolbox	is	used	to	solve	the	lagrangian	function.	(Figure	1)	systematically	illustrates	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 problem	 formulations	 and	 solution	 algorithms	evaluated.	Duos	of	heuristic	solution	algorithms	are	further	investigated	to	improve	the	 local	 solvers	 algorithm	 solutions,	 while	 token,	 mode	 and	 travel-time	parameterization	 strategies	 are	 investigated	 using	 the	 local	 solver	 solution	algorithm.		Heuristic	 1	 &	 2-solution	 algorithm	 are	 cloned	 versions	 of	 the	 local	 solvers	solution	algorithm.	However,	 the	 iterative	sub-gradient	algorithm	 for	Heuristic’s	1	algorithm	is	modified	to	scale	up	the	assigned	tokens	of	all	users	(OD	pairs)	when	a	feasible	solution	is	attained	and	the	token	constraint	is	not	binding,	while	Heuristics	2	solution	algorithm	scales	up	when	the	token	budget	constraint	is	not	binding	and	down	when	the	token	budget	constraint	is	violated.	Through	the	optimization	computations,	we	measure	the	computational	run-time	 of	 each	 solver	 and	 formulation.	 All	 computational	 experiments	were	 carried	out	 on	 a	 PC	 running	 Windows	 with	 8	 GB	 memory	 and	 Core	 i7	 3.4	 GHz	 central	processing	unit	CPU.	
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3.1 Token	Budget/Coefficient	The	 token	 budget	 is	 designed	 based	 on	 an	 exogenous	 incentive	 budget	assignment	with	an	initial	value	selected	based	on	the	assumption	that	the	decision	maker’s	 choice	 is	 to	 realize	 a	 10%	 reduction	 in	 the	 auto	mode	 share.	 Through	 a	series	of	pretests,	an	assigned	token	budget	of	$5,000	was	observed	to	have	reduced	the	choice	probability	of	using	auto	mode	by	approximately	10%	from	the	base	case	scenario	 i.e.	 no	 token	 incentives.	 This	 token	 budget	 was	 subsequently	 used	 as	 a	starting	point	 token	budget.	We	 further	 explore	how	changes	 in	 the	 token	budget	affect	 the	 system’s	 energy	 savings	 by	 an	 increment	 of	 10%	 corresponding	 to	 10	different	budgets.	Similarly,	 an	 initial	 is	 calculated	 using	 the	 logit	 model	 in	 parallel	 with	 the	choice	 probability	 of	 each	 alternative	 !!	 from	 the	 base	 case	 scenario	 with	 an	assumed	 average	 value	 of	 time	 of	 20$/hr.	 The	 token	 coefficient	 is	 successively	increased	by	(50,	70,90,110,130	and	150)%.	
Table	1:	Solution	Algorithms	for	the	Full	Problem	and	Parameterization	
Strategy		
												
Formulations	
	
												L.S	
Full	Problem	 Parameterized	
Lagrangian	Heuristics	 Lagrangian	Solution	
w/o	 1	 2	 Single	 Mode	 TT	
Global	 ✔ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Local	 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 	
3.2 Input	Data	Input	 data	 necessary	 for	 the	 analysis	 are	 obtained	 from	 the	Pioneer	Valley	Planning	 Commission	 (PVPC)	 for	 the	 Town	 of	 Amherst,	MA	 (See	 Figure	 2).	 	 They	
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comprised	a	total	of	21	traffic	analysis	zone’s	(TAZ),	each	representing	an	origin	and	destination,	corresponding	to	441	origin-destination	pairs,	of	which	encompassed	a	24-Hr	 Origin	 Destination-demand	 matrix	 for	 each	 OD	 pair.	 The	 three	 modes	 of	transportation’s	 mode	 split;	 Auto	 63.25	 %,	 Bus	 9.25	 %	 and	 Bicycle	 27.5	 %	 are	observed	from	the	PVPC	database	(14).	and	the	token	coefficients	were	adjusted	to	match	the	observed	mode	split;	Auto	62.48	%,	Bus	9.78	%	and	Bicycle	27.73	%.		A	total	of	9404	trips	were	observed	between	all	OD-pairs	and	 it	 is	assumed	that	 the	demand	 through	 the	analysis	period	 is	 inelastic.	Travel	 time	!!" ,	 in	minutes	 for	all	three	modes	of	transportation	are	manually	estimated	using	goggle	maps	for	all	OD-pairs,	while	 the	 distance	 between	 each	OD	 pair	 is	 computed	 as:	 (average-speed	 *	Travel	time	!!").	The	networks	computational	average	speed,	auto	fuel	economy	and	value	 of	 time	 of	 bus	 VOT,	 is	 assumed	 at	 values	 35	mph,	 23.4	mpg1	 and	 20	 $/hr.	consecutively	(15).	Using	 excel	 with	 previously	 obtained	 and	 assumed	 data,	 the	 travel	 time	coefficients	 are	 adjusted	 as	 follows:	 Auto	 -0.195/min,	 Bus	 in-vehicle	 -0.061/min,	Bus	 out-vehicle	 -0.122/min,	 Bicycle	 -0.15min,	 while	 the	 token	 coefficient	 of	 bus	0.183/$,	which	equals	that	of	auto	and	bicycle	for	computations	is	calculated	as:	bus	
in-vehicle	 travel	 time	 coefficient/	 value	 of	 time	 of	 bus	 !!"#$!"#!"#.	 This	 implies	 a	monetary	value	of	a	token	to	a	dollar.	The	Alternative	specific	constant	for	auto	was	interpolated	to	-0.05	Subsequently,	 the	 input	data’s	are	processed	for	application	to	 the	problem	formulations	as	listed	below:																																																									1	MAPC	Data	Services,	Massachusetts	Vehicle	Census:	http://data.mapc.org/datasets	
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Figure	1:	Amherst	Network		
			 	
	24	
CHAPTER	V	
 RESULTS	As	 described	 above,	 we	 conducted	 a	 series	 of	 analysis	 to	 study	 the	performance	 of	 various	 problems	 formulations	 and	 solution	 algorithms	 with	regards	to	the	effects	of	token	budgets	and	token	coefficients	on	energy	savings.		It	is	of	importance	to	note	that	the	scale	of	the	optimality	gaps	in	this	analysis	can	be	misleading	and	not	necessarily	accurate,	as	these	gaps	represent	the	percent	difference	between	 the	solutions	of	 lagrangian	and	objective	 function	at	a	 feasible	region.	 As	 observed	 from	 the	 solutions	 of	 the	 local	 solver	 algorithms	 in	 Table	 1,	these	 values	 were	 lower	 than	 the	 results	 from	 the	 global	 solution	 algorithm,	 but	results	 from	 the	 local	 solvers	algorithms	converged	at	 an	optimality	gap	 less	 than	1%.	 An	 explanation	 for	 this	 behavior	 is	 related	 to	 evidence	 that	 the	 lagrangian	function	from	the	local	solution	algorithm	might	not	be	solved	to	a	global	optimum.	Theoretically,	 a	 true	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 lies	 between	 the	 lagrangian	 and	objective	 function	 solutions.	 A	 non-global	 solution	 of	 the	 lagrangian	will	 certainly	result	 in	 a	 lower	 lagrangian	 solution,	 but	 still	 above	 the	 true	 solution.	 Hence	 an	inaccurately	 underestimated	 optimality	 gap	will	 be	 obtained	 at	 solutions	 that	 are	categorized	by	non-global	lagrangian	function	solutions.	The	results	of	this	analysis	are	detailed	in	the	sections	below.	
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4.1 Effectiveness	and	Efficiency	of	Solution	Algorithms	
4.1.1 Local	vs.	Global	Solver	for	Lagrangian	Solutions	When	we	consider	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	global	solver	solution	algorithm,	the	results	show	a	significant	reduction	in	the	system	wide	energy	savings	from	the	base	case	scenario	i.e.	no	token	rewards	in	the	system.	The	systems	energy	savings	was	 observed	 to	 have	 initially	 increased	 rapidly	 with	 subsequent	 incremental	increases	as	 the	 token	budget	 increased	with	a	mildly	non-linear	 relationship	and	positive	 correlation	 of	 +0.9753.	 The	 average	 energy	 consumption	 reduced	 by	12.79%	–	21.09%	for	a	token	budget	range	of	$5,000-$10,	000.	This	corresponds	to	a	 percent	 increase	 of	 the	 bus	 and	 bicycle	 mode	 share	 by	 16.70%	 -	 30.46%	 and	17.56%	-	30.67%	consecutively	(See	Table	1).	The	solutions	average	computational	run-time	 for	 this	 algorithm	 is	 43hrs.	 The	 local	 solvers	 solution	 algorithm	 reduced	the	average	energy	consumption	by	11.48%	-	19.91%	for	a	 token	budget	range	of	$5,000-$10,000.	This	corresponds	to	a	percent	increase	of	the	bus	and	bicycle	mode	share	by	11.94%	-	16.60%	and	19.33%	-	26.15%	consecutively	 (see	Table	1).	The	average	computational	run-time	for	this	algorithm	is	24	minutes.	From	these	results	above,	it	is	evident	that	the	global	solution	algorithm	performs	better	than	the	local	solution	 algorithm.	 For	 a	 range	 of	 $5,000-$10,000,	 the	 global	 solution	 algorithm	improved	by	10.22%	–	5.58%	from	the	local	solution	algorithm	(see	Table	1).					
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Table	2:	Results	from	Global	vs.	Local	Solver	Solution	Algorithm			
Token	
Budget	
($)	
Global.S	
Energy	
Savings	
(gal./day)	
Local.S		
Energy	
Savings	
(gal./day)	
Global.S	
Bus	
Mode	
Share	
(%)	
Global.S	
Bicycle	
Mode	
Share	
(%)	
Local.S	
Bus	
Mode	
Share	
(%)	
Local.S	
Bicycle	
Mode	
Share	
(%)	
Global.S	
vs.		
Local		
(%	Diff)	
5000	 148.1	 133.0	 11.79	 32.57	 11.31	 33.06	 -10.22	
5500	 157.9	 132.9	 11.96	 32.95	 11.31	 33.06	 -15.81	
6000	 168.5	 132.8	 12.03	 33.32	 11.30	 33.05	 -21.20	
6500	 179.9	 167.2	 12.25	 33.73	 11.57	 33.87	 -7.04	
7000	 189.9	 177.9	 12.38	 34.10	 11.61	 34.07	 -6.33	
7500	 199.5	 187.0	 12.49	 34.47	 11.64	 34.23	 -6.26	
8000	 208.8	 196.3	 12.65	 34.85	 11.68	 34.39	 -5.98	
8500	 218.0	 204.7	 12.81	 35.24	 11.70	 34.53	 -6.10	
9000	 227.0	 213.8	 13.02	 35.65	 11.73	 34.68	 -5.81	
9500	 235.4	 222.2	 13.08	 35.93	 11.75	 34.81	 -5.63	
10000	 244.2	 230.6	 13.18	 36.20	 11.78	 34.94	 -5.58	
4.1.2 Optimality	Convergence	of	Global	Solver	Solution	Algorithm	Observations	 indicates	 that	 all	 solution	 from	 the	 global	 solvers	 solution	algorithm	 converges	 with	 an	 optimality	 gap	 less	 than	 1%,	 which	 suggests	 the	solutions	have	less	than	a	1%	error	margin	to	the	true	solution.	(Figure	2)	shows	the	convergence	 chart	 for	 the	 lagrangian	 function	 solution	 (upper	 bound)	 and	 the	energy	savings	objective	 function	(lower	bound)	 for	a	 token	budget	of	$5000.	The	convergence	 is	 verified	 through	 an	 iterative	 method	 using	 the	 sub-gradient	algorithm.	The	4	noticeable	groups	of	oscillation	on	the	chart	are	as	a	result	of	the	changes	in	scale	of	the	step	size	of	the	sub-gradient	algorithm.	During	the	course	of	the	iterative	process,	as	the	lagrangian	function	fails	to	reduce	after	an	initial	preset	iteration	count	20,	then	subsequently	10,	the	step	size	scale	is	reduced	by	a	factor	of	2	until	a	 lower	 lagrangian	solution	 is	obtained	concurrently	with	a	better	(higher)	
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feasible	 solution	 of	 objective	 function.	 This	 sequence	 is	 repeated	 until	 both	functions	converge	at	an	optimality	gap	less	than	1%.			
Figure	2:	Optimality	Gap	Convergence	Chart	of	Energy	Savings		
	
4.1.3 Lagrangian	Heuristics	Observations	 from	 the	 local	 solvers	 solution	 sets	 indicate	 that	 the	 token	budgets	 $5500	 and	 $6000	 had	 optimal	 gaps	 of	 8.66%	 and	 15.02%	 consecutively,	significantly	 higher	 than	 an	 acceptable	 threshold	 of	 1%.	 A	 duo	 of	 lagrangian	heuristic	 solution	 algorithms	 are	 proposed	 to	 improve	 the	 effectiveness	 and	efficiency	 of	 the	 local	 solver’s	 solution	 algorithm	 for	 token	 budgets	 were	 by	 the	lagrangian	and	objective	function	failed	to	converge	at	an	acceptable	optimal	gap,	as	described	 in	 the	 chapter	 above.	 This	 failure	 is	 attributed	 to	 the	 oscillation	 of	 the	lagrangian	function	solutions	at	a	local	optimum.	
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For	 token	 budgets	 $5500	 and	 $6000,	 the	 first	 heuristic	 solution	 algorithm	(heuristic	1)	is	observed	to	improve	the	performance	of	the	local	solvers	algorithm.	Although	 still	 worse	 off	 than	 the	 global	 solution	 algorithms,	 the	 realized	 energy	savings	 was	 9.90%	 and	 8.69%	 consecutively	 lower	 than	 the	 global	 solution	algorithms,	 when	 compared	 to	 15.81%	 and	 21.20%	 from	 the	 local	 solution	algorithm,	while	 the	 computational	 run	 time	was	 reduced	 by	 (25mins)	 a	 99.03%	change	from	the	global	solutions	run	time	(43	hrs.).	The	Latter	(Heuristic	2)	results	to	a	9.22%	and	6.64%	reduction	consecutively	 from	the	global	solution	algorithm,	while	the	computational	run	time	was	reduced	by	99.49%	(13mins)	from	the	global	solution	algorithm.	Nevertheless,	both	heuristic	solutions	are	noted	to	be	worse	off	than	 the	 local	 solvers	 solutions	 for	 token	 budget	 solutions	 that	 already	 had	 a	significantly	 low	 optimal	 gap	 (less	 than	 1%),	 as	 observed	 for	 the	 solutions	 of	 all	token	budgets	except	5500	and	6000.	This	 failure	 in	 improvement	 is	attributed	 to	distortions	in	the	iterative	process	as	the	objective	functions	are	heuristically	scaled.																		
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Table	3:	Effects	of	Global	Solver	Algorithm	vs.	Local	Optimization	Solver	
Heuristic	Solutions	
	
Token	
Budget	
($)	
Global.S	
Energy	
Savings	
(gal.	/day)	
Local.S	
Optm.	
[No-	
Heuristic]	
(gal.	/day)	
Heuristic-	
1		
(gal.	/day)	
Heuristic-
2		
(gal.	/day)	
Global.S	
vs.	
Heuristic-	
1	(%	diff)	
Global.S	
vs.	
Heuristic-	
2	(%	diff)	
5000	 148.1	 133.0	 130.2	 130.2	 -12.09	 -12.08	
5500	 157.9	 132.9	 142.3	 143.4	 -9.90	 -9.22	
6000	 168.5	 132.8	 153.9	 157.3	 -8.69	 -6.64	
6500	 179.9	 167.2	 166.6	 166.8	 -7.38	 -7.29	
7000	 189.9	 177.9	 176.4	 168.1	 -7.09	 -11.48	
7500	 199.5	 187.0	 178.5	 187.3	 -10.54	 -6.14	
8000	 208.8	 196.3	 191.1	 196.4	 -8.47	 -5.93	
8500	 218.0	 204.7	 203.5	 204.6	 -6.63	 -6.13	
9000	 227.0	 213.8	 212.4	 213.8	 -6.44	 -5.82	
9500	 235.4	 222.2	 222.7	 221.5	 -5.41	 -5.90	
10000	 244.2	 230.6	 221.8	 229.5	 -9.17	 -6.00	
4.2 Effectiveness	and	Efficiency	of	Parameterization	Strategies	Results	from	the	parameterized	formulations	were	observed	to	have	resulted	in	lower	energy	savings	when	compared	to	the	original	problem	formulation	with	a	global	 solver	 solution	 algorithm.	 The	 parameterization	 strategy	 analyses	 were	conducted	using	a	local	solver	algorithm	for	the	lagrangian	solutions.	Although,	from	observation	 of	 the	 local	 vs.	 global	 solution	 algorithm	 above,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	local	solvers	solution	algorithm	did	not	solve	the	 lagrangian	 functions	to	optimum	solutions,	 which	 resulted	 in	 lower	 energy	 savings	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 global	solvers	 solution	 algorithm.	 An	 exhaustive	 search	 method	 is	 used	 to	 validate	 the	solutions	of	the	token	parameterization	solutions	of	the	lagrangian	are	solved	to	the	optimal	 solution	 with	 the	 correct	 optimality	 gap	 to	 the	 objective	 function.	 This	
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selection	 was	 based	 on	 the	 analogy	 and	 can	 be	 theoretically	 proven	 that	 the	solutions	of	the	token	parameterized	formulations	are	convex	at	optimum.	Observations	from	this	analysis	showed	a	generic	improvement	in	the	energy	savings	 across	 all	 three-parameterization	 strategies	 as	 token	 budget	 is	 increased.	Overall,	 across	 all	 token	 budget	 scenarios,	 travel-time,	 mode	 and	 token	parameterization	 solutions,	 were	 observed	 to	 be	 3.2%,	 13.4%	 and	 13.7%	consecutively	less	than	the	solutions	obtained	from	the	original	formulation	with	a	global	solver.	These	results	indicate	road	users	are	more	sensitive	to	average	travel-time	 over	 mode	 choice	 and	 token	 consumption.	 Hence,	 the	 travel	 time	parameterization	 strategy	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 more	 efficient	 token	 allocation	strategy	from	the	menu	of	strategies	observed.	Mode/token	 parameterization	 and	 travel	 time	 and	 strategies	 improved	 the	problems	 computational	 efficiency	 by	 99.81%	 (5mins)	 and	 99.73%	 (7mins)	consecutively.	 To	 save	 computational	 time,	 it	 is	 observed	 that	 the	 parameterized	allocation	 strategy	 could	 be	 used	 in	 place	 of	 the	 original	 problem	 with	 a	 global	solver,	but	not	without	an	optimality	penalty	 i.e.	 ranging	between	4.5-18.3%	 for	a	token	budget	of	5000.	(See	Table	3).							
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Table	4:	Global	Solver	Algorithm	vs.	Parameterization	Strategies	Effect	of	
Original	Formulation	
	
Token	
Budget	
($)	
Single	
P.Strategy	
	(gal.	
/day)	
Mode	
P.Strategy	
(gal.	/day)	
Travel-
Time	
P.Strategy		
(gal.	/day)	
Global	vs.	
Single	
P.Strategy	
	(%	Diff.)	
Global	vs.	
Mode	
P.Strategy	
(%	Diff.)	
Global	vs.	
Travel-
Time	
P.Strategy		
(%	Diff.)	
5000	 121.0	 121.0	 141.5	 -18.27	 -18.27	 -4.474	
5500	 131.7	 131.7	 152.3	 -16.58	 -16.58	 -3.551	
6000	 142.2	 143.3	 162.6	 -15.62	 -14.98	 -3.498	
6500	 152.5	 153.5	 171.4	 -15.25	 -14.67	 -4.723	
7000	 162.5	 163.6	 183.2	 -14.42	 -13.86	 -3.527	
7500	 172.5	 173.0	 193.4	 -13.52	 -13.30	 -3.070	
8000	 182.3	 183.1	 203.0	 -12.68	 -12.29	 -2.752	
8500	 191.6	 191.8	 212.4	 -12.11	 -12.00	 -2.564	
9000	 200.8	 202.0	 221.2	 -11.54	 -11.04	 -2.561	
9500	 210.5	 211.3	 230.6	 -10.58	 -10.27	 -2.044	
10000	 219.3	 220.3	 239.1	 -10.18	 -9.78	 -2.076	
	
4.2.1 Token	Efficiency	in	Various	Parameterization	Strategies	As	expected,	 the	 token	energy	 efficiency	parameter	decreased	as	 the	 token	budget	 increased.	 This	 observation	 indicates	 that	 as	 more	 tokens	 are	 introduced	into	 the	 system,	 the	 energy	 savings	 in	 the	 system	 increases	 while	 road	 users	consume	 more	 tokens.	 It	 is	 of	 importance	 to	 note	 the	 inversely	 non-linear	relationship	 between	 the	 token	 budgets	 and	 energy	 savings	 per	 token	 !.	 As	 the	token	 budget	 increased,	 the	 average	 energy	 savings	 per	 token	 reduced.	 An	explanation	for	this	observation	is	in	accordance	with	the	allocation	of	more	tokens	to	the	same	level	of	energy	savings	as	the	token	budget	increased,	hence	a	smaller	energy	savings	per	token	will	be	realized.	(See	Appendix	A)	
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4.3 Sensitivity	Analysis	w.r.t	Token	Coefficient	Similarly,	 for	 a	 token	 budget	 of	 5000,	 a	 50-150%	 increase	 of	 the	 token	coefficient	 resulted	 in	 a	 reduction	 ranging	 between	 17.4%	 –	 25.84%	 in	 energy	savings	(see	Table	5).	Changes	in	the	token	coefficient	appear	to	be	sensitive	to	the	systems	 energy	 savings.	 Energy	 savings	 was	 observed	 to	 increase	 as	 token	coefficient	increased.	The	two	variables	are	correlated	by	an	index	of	+0.997,	which	suggest	a	strong	correlation.	The	optimality	gaps	for	all	solution	were	less	than	2%.	The	 solution	 obtained	when	 the	 coefficient	 of	 token	 are	 varied	with	 a	 fixed	 base	budget	show	that	energy	savings	increases	as	the	coefficient	of	tokens	are	increased.	The	energy	savings	per	 token	 increases	as	 the	coefficient	of	 token	 increase	with	a	non-linear	 relationship.	The	 token	coefficient	has	a	proportional	 relationship	with	the	value	of	time.	Therefore,	as	the	VOT	is	increased,	the	results	indicate	an	increase	in	energy	savings.	This	essentially	means	the	model	 is	somewhat	sensitive	to	road	users	VOT.	
Table	5:	Effect	of	Token	Coefficient	
	
Token	Budget	
($)	
Token	coefficient	
(%	Incr.)	
Energy	Savings	
(gal./day)	
Energy	Savings	
(%	Change)	
5000	 50	 202	 17.47	
5000	 70	 227	 19.58	
5000	 90	 245	 21.18	
5000	 110	 267	 23.01	
5000	 130	 283	 24.46	
5000	 150	 299	 25.84	
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CHAPTER	VI	
 CONCLUSION	AND	RECOMMENDATIONS	
5.1 Summary	of	Findings	An	incentive	optimization	method	with	global	and	local	solvers	is	presented	that	 maximizes	 logit	 model	 based	 formulations	 to	 attain	 optimal	 and	 feasible	solutions	 w.r.t	 energy	 savings	 while	 satisfying	 budget	 constraints.	 Important	parameters	 that	 affect	 energy	 saving’s	 in	 a	 road	 transportation	 system	have	 been	studied,	 both	 the	 token	 budget	 and	 coefficients	 of	 token.	 We	 also	 present	 a	parameterized	 formulation	 that	 necessitates	 equity	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 a	constrained	budget	and	highlight	the	efficiency	of	this	approach	through	numerical	results.	 This	 formulation	 ensures	 that	 each	unit	 of	 reward	 is	 equitable	 to	 a	 single	unit	of	energy	savings	and	provides	alternative	policy	options	 to	decision	makers.	Strong	evidence	exists	 to	conclude	that	 there	 is	a	positive	correlation	between	the	system’s	 energy	 savings	 and	 the	 aforementioned	 parameters.	 An	 increase	 in	 the	token	budget	resulted	to	an	increase	in	expected	energy	savings	as	expected,	while	the	 travel-time	parameterization	provided	 a	more	 cost	 effective	 computation	 as	 a	substitute	 to	 the	 original	 problem	 formulation,	 saving	 significant	 computational	time.	 Furthermore,	 the	 analysis	 demonstrated	 that	 a	 global	 solver	 algorithm	 is	necessary	to	obtain	a	best	attainable	optimal	solution	when	designing	an	incentive	optimization	problem.	These	observations	substantiate	the	concept	that	 incentives	allocation	in	a	transportation	system	is	an	alternative	strategy	to	congestion	pricing	in	 reducing	 fuel	 consumption	 and	 ultimately	 increasing	 energy	 savings	 with	 less	
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resources	 expended	while	 eliminating	 the	 often	 referenced	 social	 equity	 amongst	road	users.	While	this	research	has	been	able	to	successfully	demonstrate	that	assigning	rewards	 to	 a	 transportation	 network	 can	 effectively	 result	 to	 the	 reduction	 of	fuel/energy	 consumption,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 same	 outcomes	 or	attributes	might	not	necessarily	apply	when	formulated	for	a	different	city,	as	mode	splits	and	travel	time	indexes	will	vary	across	different	cities.	
5.2 Limitations	With	 these	 potential	 modeling	 framework	 contributions	 in	 mind,	 it	 is	essential	 to	 recognize	 its	 associated	 limitation.	 The	 Town	 of	 Amherst	 is	geographically	 constrained	by	a	 sprawled	network	with	 a	moderate	public	 transit	service	relative	to	its	size.	When	considering	transit	options,	on	average	the	distance	and	travel	time	between	a	majority	of	the	OD	pairs	is	relatively	large,	which	signals	a	 higher	 likelihood	 of	 road	 users	 using	 auto	 mode	 to	 avoid	 high	 door	 to	 door	walking	 distance.	 Similarly,	 bikers	 would	 be	 less	 willing	 to	 bike	 long	 distance	 in	other	to	save	travel	time.	Taking	into	consideration	weather	effects,	road	users	will	be	less	willing	to	use	mass	transit	during	inclement	weather	conditions.	Another	key	limitation	of	this	study	is	the	omission	of	road	users	household	and	socioeconomic	variables.	The	absence	of	these	characteristic	variables	could	potential	increase	the	likelihood	of	model	bias	upwards	on	the	solutions.	
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5.3 Future	Work	Due	to	the	complexity	and	non-linear	characteristic	of	 the	problem	studied.	The	model	was	simplified	by	using	a	naive	and	simplistic	utility	function	to	ensure	proper	 understanding	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 decision	 variables	 involved.	Future	studies	on	this	research	can	be	improved	by	expanding	the	vehicles	classes	(truck/cars	etc.)	used	in	the	model	to	further	reflect	a	more	realistic	representation	and	variability	of	energy	consumptions	by	road	users.	The	model	can	subsequently	be	 expanded	by	 increasing	 the	number	of	 decision	 variables	 that	 affect	 individual	choice	 of	 modes	 of	 road	 transportation	 to	 improve	 the	 predictability	 and	 reduce	bias	of	 the	 choice	models/probability	 in	 the	utility	 function.	The	 traffic	 conditions	for	 the	analysis	are	considered	 the	best-case	scenario	based	on	 the	assumption	of	free	 flow	 travel	 speed,	 which	 accounts	 for	 a	 constant	 travel	 time.	 A	 dynamic	optimization	 approach	 can	 be	 used	 to	 model	 the	 problem	 rather	 than	 a	 static	optimization	 to	 reflect	 realistic	 congestion	 effects,	 which	 include	 dynamically	varying	rewards	based	on	the	current	and	predicted	state	of	the	system.	Similarly,	future	research	in	this	area	of	study	will	comprise	of	a	bi-level	optimization	problem	formulation	 where	 a	 high	 level	 optimization	 aims	 at	 maximizing	 system-wide	energy	savings,	while	a	low-level	consumer	surplus	maximization	problem	is	solved	for	each	system	user.			 	
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 APPENDIX		
TABLE	RESULTS	OF	TOKEN	EFFICIENCY	FOR	PARAMETERIZED	STRATEGIES	
Parameterization	-	 Single	 Mode	 Average	Travel-Time	
Token	
Budget	
($)	
e	 Energy	
Savings	
(gal./day)	
Global	
vs.	
Single	
P.	(%	
Diff.)	
e-bus	 e-	
bike	
Energy	
Savings	
(gal./day)	
Global	
vs.	
Mode	
P.	(%	
Diff.)	
e-[(7-22)min.]	 e-[(23-33)min.]	 e-[(34-55)min.]	 Energy	
Savings	
(gal./day)	
Global	
vs.	
Travel	
Time	P.	
(%	
Diff.)	
5000	 0.095	 121.0	 -18.27	 0.065	 0.117	 121.0	 -18.27	 *	 0.257	 0.054	 141.5	 -4.47	
5500	 0.087	 131.7	 -16.58	 0.063	 0.109	 131.7	 -16.58	 *	 0.196	 0.052	 152.3	 -3.55	
6000	 0.081	 142.2	 -15.62	 0.059	 0.095	 143.3	 -14.98	 *	 0.160	 0.050	 162.6	 -3.50	
6500	 0.076	 152.5	 -15.25	 0.056	 0.088	 153.5	 -14.67	 *	 0.138	 0.048	 171.4	 -4.72	
7000	 0.072	 162.5	 -14.42	 0.054	 0.082	 163.6	 -13.86	 *	 0.117	 0.046	 183.2	 -3.53	
7500	 0.068	 172.5	 -13.52	 0.052	 0.077	 173.0	 -13.30	 *	 0.103	 0.044	 193.4	 -3.07	
8000	 0.064	 182.3	 -12.68	 0.051	 0.072	 183.1	 -12.29	 *	 0.093	 0.043	 203.0	 -2.75	
8500	 0.062	 191.6	 -12.11	 0.049	 0.069	 191.8	 -12.00	 *	 0.084	 0.041	 212.4	 -2.56	
9000	 0.059	 200.8	 -11.54	 0.047	 0.064	 202.0	 -11.04	 *	 0.078	 0.040	 221.2	 -2.56	
9500	 0.056	 210.5	 -10.58	 0.046	 0.061	 211.3	 -10.27	 *	 0.072	 0.039	 230.6	 -2.04	
10000	 0.054	 219.3	 -10.18	 0.045	 0.059	 220.3	 -9.777	 *	 0.067	 0.038	 239.1	 -2.08		 Note:	*	indicates	a	very	large	number	for	e	(no	token	assigned)	
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